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NOTES
FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST
DISSOLVED CORPORATIONS
THE COMMON-LAW concept that a corporation ceases to exist upon its
dissolution' under the laws of the state of incorporation2 has often en-
'A corporation might cease to exist for general purposes by a dissolution, United
States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., zoS F.zd 936 ( 7th Cir. 1953) United States v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 14o F.zd 834 (oth Cir. 1944), or by a merger, United States
v. United States Vanadium Corp., 23o F.zd 646 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.s.
939 (1956), ajirning in part United States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 132
F. Supp. 388 (D. Colo. 1955) i United States v. Line Material Co., zoz F. zd 929 (6th
Cir. 1953), or by a consolidation, United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, Inc.,
136 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
The terms "dissolve" and "dissolution" hereafter refer to all 3 forms of corporate
termination: dissolution, merger, and consolidation.
'In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927), Chief
Justice Tift said, "It is well settled that at common law an(' in the federal jurisdiction
a corporation which has been dissolved is as if it did not exist, and the result of the
dissolution cannot be distinguished from the death of a natural person in its effect.
[Citation of cases omitted.] It follows therefore that, as the death of the natural person
abates aipending litigation to which such a person is a party, dissolution of a corpora-
tion at common law, abates all litigation in which the corporation is appearing either
as plaintiff or defendant. . . ." Accord, Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Ware-
house Co., 336 U.S. 631 (1949) ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six
Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 (1937) ; National Bank v. Colby, 88 U.S. (25 Wall.)
609 (1874) ; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)- zx (1834). This analogy was
criticized in Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations-A Study in Interstate and
Federal-State Relationships, 58 HARv. L. Ra"V. 675, 677 (1945): "Dissolution of a
corporation has often been referred to, in judicial discussions of this problem, as similar
to the death of an individual. A number of statements of this sort are to be found in
opinions of the Supreme Court, usually in cases where dissolution took place under
statutes which were silent as to continuing the existence of dissolved corporations for
purposes of suit. Such statements appear to represent only an uncritical search for
analogies. Historically and practically, there are significant differences in the rules
applicable to deceased individuals and to dissolved corporations." And the analogy has
also been criticized on the basis that statutes allowing survival of civil actions beyond
death have been construed not to apply to corporations. Comment, 21 U. CHI. L. REv.
48o, 482 6954).
There must be some statutory authority for the prolongation of a corporation's exist-
ence, even for purposes of litigation. Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse
Co., 336 U.S. 631 (1949); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wil-
cox Bldg. Corp., supra; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 (1927);
United States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 2o8 F.2d 936 ( 7th Cir. 1953) ; United States
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 140 F.2d 834 (ioth Cir. 1944). See BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 315, 316 (1946 ed.); x6 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8142, 8143
(perm. rev. ed. repl. 1942, cum. supp. 1958).
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abled a corporation to avoid its legal obligations. This idea of corporate
"death" has consequently evoked state "saving" statutes, under which a
corporation is given an extended life, at least for the purpose of carry-
ing on during the winding-up period those activities which are necessary
to discharge its civil obligations. One significant question which raises
in the application of these states enactments is whether they comprehend
federal criminal actions against a corporation during the winding-up
period.3 To answer this question, federal courts have characteristically
looked solely to the statute of the state of incorporation. All too fre-
quently, a strict construction of saving statutes has impelled the con-
clusion that criminal actions did not survive dissolution.
Perhaps the most egregious instance of this unfortunate develop-
ment is United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,4 in which motions by six
corporations to quash federal indictments for. violation of the Sherman
Act5 were sustained on grounds that the corporations had been dissolved
prior to the indictments." The decision rested upon a narrow inter-
pretation of the words "suit)' 7 "action,"" and "proceeding," 9 which words
'See generally Marcus, supra note 2; Comment, 21 U. Cmi. L. REV. 480 (1954).
& 140 F.2d 834 (oth Cir. 1944).
26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
' Other decisions dimissing federal prosecutions because of corporate dissolution are:
United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. La. 1942), in which the corporation
had dissolved under the Texas statute after indictment for violation of the Connolly
Hot Oil Act; United States v. Line Material Co., 2o2 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953), in
which a Delaware corporation merged with another corporation after indictment for
violation of the Sherman Act; United States v. United States Vanadium Corp., 230 F.2d
646 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (956), in which corporations incorporated
in West Virginia and Delaware merged after indictment for violation of the Sherman
Act. The court in the Vanadium decision refused dismissal of an indictment against
a New York corporation which had merged with the other two, thus reversing in part
United States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 132 F. Supp. 388 (D. Colo. 1955).
'The court construed the term "suit" in the statutes of Delaware, DEL. REV. CODE
§ 2074 (1935), as amended, 43 Laws of Del. 1941, ch. 132, § ii, now DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1953) (slightly changed in form only), and of Nevada, NEV. CoMP.
LAWS §§ 1664, 1666 (1929) (amended by NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.585, 78.595 (1957)),
as not including a criminal prosecution. It has also been held in United States v. Union
Carbide and Carbon Corp., .rupra note 6, affirmed in part, United States v. United
States Vanadium Corp., supra note 6, that "suit" in the West Virginia statute, W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3095 (1955), did not include a criminal prosecution. In United States
v. Line Material Co., 202 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953), the court held "suit" to be the
dominating word in the Delaware statute and that it did not mean criminal proceeding.
But see United States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 2o8 F.zd 936 (7th Cir. 1953), in
which the court held the word "suit" not to be dominant.
aThe word "laction" in the California statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 399 (1941), now
CAL. CORP. LAW §§ 5400, 5401 (slightly changed in form only), was interpreted as not
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the various statutes employed to describe the activities surviving dissolu-
tion."° The Safeway case has been strongly criticized as an invitation to
violate the law, in that a corporation, for example, might profitably act
in restraint of competition and then either dissolve or merge with an-
other corporation in order to gain immunity from criminal responsi-
bility."1 Such actions would, in effect, precipitate indirect state inter-
meaning criminal prosecution. Contra, United States v. Cigarette Merchandising Ass'n,
136 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), in which "action"r was shown to include a crim-
inal proceeding in New York.
9 The term "judicial proceedings" in the Texas statute, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1388 (2945), was construed not to include criminal proceedings. Contra, Alamo
Fence Co. of Houston v. United States, 240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957), as to "judicial
proceedings." And see United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers, Inc., 145
F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1956); United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage
Ass'n, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1956), reversed on other grounds, 240 F.zd
420 (4 th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.zd 936 (7th Cir.
1953); United States v. Auerbach, 68 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Cal. 1946), in which the
word "proceeding" was held to include criminal prosecution.
'0 There appear to he two main reasons for the strict construction of the state
"saving" statutes when dealing with abatement of criminal prosecutions: the rule that
criminal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and for the accused, MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAW 37 (1934), and the idea that a corporation cannot sue or be sued unless
a statute authorizes it, thus requiring affirmative authority for any such suit. See s6
FL-TCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 8142. But see Bahen & Wright, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 176 F.2d 538 ( 4th Cir. 1949), in which it was declared that such statutes should
be liberally construed.
"' "To hold that criminal actions against corporations abate upon their dissolution
invites violation of the law... 21 Marcus, supra note 2, at 703. In United States v.
Western Pennsylvania Sand and Gravel Ass'n, x4 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1953),
the court enjoined dissolution of the defendant corporation in order to retain jurisdic-
tion over it. The court felt that to allow such a proceeding to abate would be to provide
a method for defrauding the public while avoiding prosecution.
It should be noted, however, that in none of the cases in which dissolution was held
to abate the prosecution was it suggested that the corporation dissolved for the purpose
of avoiding prosecution. Safe.way comes close, for one of the corporations dissolved
only 4 days before indictment, the business of the dissolved corporations continued, the
physical plant and personnel were left unaffected by dissolution, and even the name
persisted. Marcus, supra note 2, at 704. In United States v. Line Material Co., 2oz
F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953), it was conceded that the dissolution was in good faith. The
dissolution in United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. La. 1942), was also in
good faith, based on the lack of need for that corporation in the corporate structure.
United States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 132 F. Supp. 388 (D. Colo. 1955), is
interesting in that 3 corporations under indictment merging with their parent corporation
and the prosecution was held to have abated upon the merger; thus the whole was im-
mune from indictment even though consisting of guilty (or at least indictable) parts.
Abatement as to one of the merging corporations was reversed, however, by the Vanadium
decision.
[Vol. 1959: 29Z
Vol. 1959: 792] FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACTIONS 295
ference with federal law and could seriously frustrate federal policies.12
Dependence on state winding-up statutes also detracts from the
efficacy of the federal laws, since these enactments not only feature dis-
similar terms in different states, but also admit of variant intepretations.' 3
For example: The words "actions, suit, and proceeding" in the Delaware
statute have been held by some circuits not to countenance criminal
prosecutions after dissolution.' 4 In other circuits the same act has been
held to sanction criminal actions.' 5 Thus, a corporation's accountability
for federal crimes may vary not only in different states, but in different
federal courts. Surely a federal criminal statute can and should be more
uniformly enforced.
The abatement of antitrust criminal actions seems even more illogical
when it is observed that suits for treble damages do survive dissolution.'"
Finally, even the basic common law analogy between corporate
"-Comment, 21 U. CHI. L. Rav. 480, 487 n. 53 (1954), which declares that "in
the field of bankruptcy, the federal courts have quite uniformly prevented dissolution
from affecting the paramount jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. . . 2' In United States
v. Leche, supra note ii, the court labored to avoid subjecting federal law to the state
dissolution statutes, though holding that the action abated under common law. This case
was strongly criticized in Marcus, supra note 2.
"'For a recent compilation, see 56 MICH. L. REV. 296, 297 n. 7 0957)-
21 United States v. United States Vanadium Corp., 23o F.2d 646 (oth Cir.), cert.
dtnied, 351 U.S. 939 (x956), affirming in part United States v. Union Carbide and
Carbon Corp., 132 F. Supp. 388 (D. Colo. 1955) ; United States v. Line Material Co.,
ao2 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953).
"United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, Inc., 138 F. Supp.
685 (D. Md. 1956), reversed on other grounds, 240 F. 2d 420 (4 th Cir. x957) ; United
States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.zd 936 (7th Cir. 1953).
Such a diversity in construction may also be illustrated by the conifict as to the
meaning of the words "judicial proceeding" in the Texas statute. See note 9 supra. "
"e See Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.zd 645 (4th Cir.
1942) (in which the treble damages action was held not to be abated by a state statute
of limitations); Moore v. Backus, 78 F.zd 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 64o
(1935) (in which the treble damages action was held to survive the death of the
person injured); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed.
574 (2nd Cir. x9x6) (in which treble damages suit was held to survive against the
estate of the decedent). Similarly, an action for an injunction under the antitrust laws
has been held not to abate upon dissolution of the defendant corporation. United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U;S. 29o (1897); United States v. Bates Valve
Bag Corp., 39 F.zd 162 (D. Del. 1930). See also United States v. Cigarette Mer-
chandisers Ass'n, Inc., .136 F. Supp. 214, 217 (S.D.N.Y. x955).
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § x6 (t946), affords the complainant a prima
facie presumption of liability in case of a criminal conviction of the defendant. Abate-
ment of the criminal suit would seem, therefore, contrary to the policy of this federal
statute. 67 HIARv. L. REv. 9o2 (1954).
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and natural persons, which buttresses cases such as Safeway, seems ques-
tionable, since the prosecution of a dissolved corporation is really not
equatable to the prosecution of a dead man. A corporate wrong will very
often be an act by which the corporation profits at the expense of the
public, and in such cases, vindication of the public interest would have
the same effect-a fine reaching ultimately to the stockholders-whether
occurring before or after dissolution." Thus, such postdissolution suits
achieve the desirable purpose of deterring directors and stockholders
from authorizing antitrust violations or other illegal acts.
United States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp."' was the first of many
decisions to oppose the Safeway approach to construction of the saving
statutes. The court there held that, although the words "action" and
"suit" might not contemplate a criminal prosecution, when the word
"proceeding" is added, "a combination is presented which is well near
inclusive of all forms of litigation." 9 The same rationale was adopted
in United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, Inc.,2
where the court posited that "statutes of this type are broadly remedial"
and so should be liberally construed.21 The Fifth Circuit went even
further in Alamo Fence Co. of Houston v. United States,2 - asserting
that a state can no more continue the existence of a corporation while
immunizing it against federal criminal prosecution than it could have
created a corporation with such immunity.
Recent decisions have also construed the New York saving statutes
to permit criminal actions subsequent to dissolution. In United States
v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, the court relied on controlling state
law, which defined "action" to include criminal litigation,2 and on the
broad policy consideration that corporate liability for criminal acts should
"v See Marcus, supra note 2, at 68x.
13 2o8 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1953).
'Old. at 939-
20 138 F. Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1956), reversed on other grounds, 240 F.zd 420
(2957).
21 138 F. Supp. at 709, quoting from Bahen & Wright, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176
F.2d 538, 539 (4 th Cir. 1949).2224o F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1957), based much on Justice Cardozo's dissent in
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. u2o,
131 (1937).
22 136 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
'N.Y. GEN. CoNsTR. LAW § 12(a) defined "action," concluding that "actions are
of two kinds: civil and criminal." And the court also cited a case in which the New
York Court of Appeals had construed "action" to include criminal prosecution. People
v. Elliott, 172 N.Y. 146, 64 N.E. 837 (1902).
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not be erased by "dialectical definitions."' 5 This decision was followed in
United States v. United States Vanadium Corp.,28 in which the Tenth
Circuit indicated a reluctance to apply its own Safeway construction, ex-
cept to the statutes therein involved.' A 1958 decision, United States
v. Brakes, IM.,28 construed the words "liabilities and obligations" in the
New York statute2 to include criminal proceedings. While the court
arrived at this result through examination of the construction given the
same words in other statutory contexts," the opinion further suggested
that a state may not have the power to insulate a corporation from federal
criminal jurisdiction.31
Despite the apparent trend toward liberal construction of state
winding-up statutes, characterized by the Collier case, some courts yet
retain the view propounded in Safeway. The Tenth Circuit, for in-
stance, has refused on the ground of stare decisis expressly to overrule
its own Safeway decision, 2 although the court's failure to advance an-
other basis for the Safeway interpretation indicated a dissatisfaction with
the case. Furthermore, the states still ostensibly retain the power to
"United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 214, 217
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
so 23o F.zd 646 (oth Cir. 1956), reversing as to the New York statute United
States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 132 F. Supp. 388 (D. Colo. 1955), cert.
denied, 35x U.S. 939 (x956).
"The court in the Vanadium case, supra note 26, while deciding otherwise as to
the New York statute, declined to overrule its Safeway decision upon the word "suits"
in the West Virginia statute and upon the Delaware statute.28 157 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. x958 ) .
"'N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § io5(8). This section provides for continued existence
of a dissolved corporation. It should be noted that United States v. Cigarette Mer-
chandisers Ass'n, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. x955), involved a different section-
N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 9o--dealing with existence of a corporation upon consolida-
tion.
"The court cited People v. Bankers' Capital Corp., 137 Misc. 293, 241 N.Y.S. 693
(Superior Ct. Kings Co. 1930), in which N.Y. GaN. CoRP. LAw § 26(.)(e) was
construed to permit service of process upon the secretary of state for criminal actions,
and In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. x947),
in which N.Y. STOcK CoRP. LAw § 9o was interpreted to include a criminal prosecu-
tion under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
' "I entertain serious doubt as to the power of a state to insulate a corporation from
federal criminal prosecution.' United States v. Brakes, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 916, 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"The court in the Vanadium case gave as-its reason for not overruling the-Safeway -
decision that for one court 'qightly" to overrule a decision by an earlier court would
put the law in a state of flux so that no one could tell what the law would be without
considering the membership of the court. 130 F.2d at 649. No other reason for re-
tention of the Safecoai rule was mentioned.
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immunize dissolving corporations, either by state court decisions con-
struing statutory language to exclude criminal proceedings or by state
legislation.
Of the few attempts to reach a solution to the problem posed by the
Saf&way rule, most have fallen short of the mark. Two states 8 3 how-
ever, have undertaken to relieve their statutes of possible ambiguity by
expressly providing for criminal actions against a corporation during its
winding-up period. The problem remains in a great many other states,
of course, and there is no reason to assume that similar statutes will be
passed on a large scale.3" A district court suggested another possible
solution in United States v. Western Pennsylvania Sand and Gravel
Ass'n, when it granted an injunction against the dissolution of a corpo-
ration in order to retain jurisdiction over it for criminal prosecution.
This technique suffers from several pragmatic defects, however. Since
the Government would not usually be informed in advance that a spe-
cific corporation is contemplating dissolution, this approach would be of
but little practical value unless injunctions were granted automatically
upon the filing of an indictment.36 Yet, such an automatic injunction
policy would be liable unduly to hamper dissolutions and reorganizations
based on good faith business necessities. Moreover, an automatic in-
junction law would not reach a corporation which dissolved prior to its
indictment3
, In North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-Iso(C) (Supp. 1957), provides that
"any claim existing or action or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending . . .may be
prosecuted as if such merger or consolidation had not taken place, or such surviving or
new corporation may be substituted in its place . . . ," and § 5 5 -114(d) provides that
".... no action or proceding, civil or criminal, to which a corporation is a party shall
abate by reason of such dissolution or filing. .. ." (Emphasis added.) In Colorado,
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-6-3 (Supp. 1957), provides that "such dissolution shall
not take away or impair any remedy given against such corporation, its stockholders,
officers, directors, incorporators or trustees, for any liabilities, whether civil or criminal,
incurred previous to such dissolution." (Emphasis added.) See 56 MICH. L. REv,
296 (3957).
" Even if all states did include such clarifying terms in their winding~up statutes, a
theoretical objection -would still exist. Each state would still possess the power to
change its statute and thus to immunize the dissolved corporation. But see United. States
v. Brakes, Inc., 157 F, Supp..z96 .(S.).N.Y. 1958).
ixs4 F. Supp. 158 (W,D. Pa. 1953). See also In re Electric. Supply Co., 175'
Fed. 61z (S.D. Ga. 3909), in which an injunction against dissolution was granted to
preserve federal.bankruptcy jurisdiction.... . .. ..
".Comment, 21 U.-CHi. L. Ra,. 48o (-1'954) ;58 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (1956).
'The Safeway .case,. it should he noted, involved a dissolution before the indictment,
as did the. Collier -and, Brakes cases. . :. . ."
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Perhaps the difficulties inherent in this problem could best be met in
a definitive ruling by the United States Supreme Court to the effect that
the operation of federal laws cannot be impaired by the familiar vagaries
of state saving statutes. Such a ruling would seem reasonably to rest
upon the supremacy clause of the Constitution 8 The Supreme Court,
however, denied certiorari in the United States Vanadium case," al-
though that decision dearly mirrored the conflict by construing a New
York statute to include federal criminal prosecution, while at the same
time following the Safeway construction as to Delaware and West Vir-
ginia winding-up statutes.
In view of the lack of agreement among the federal courts as to the
extent of state power over federal criminal jurisdiction, and in view of
the Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to resolve this conflict, it ap-
pears that the most feasible way to stabilize the law would be to enact
federal legislation expressly continuing corporate criminal responsibility
for some period after dissolution.40 Such legislation would achieve the
sensible result of vindicating the superiority of federal laws over state
dissolution statutes.
" 11[T]he court has steadily held to the doctrine, vital to the United States as well
as to the States, that a state enactment, even if passed in the exercise of its acknowledged
powers, must yield, in case of conflict, to the supremacy of the Constitution of the
United States and the acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of its provisions." Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 347 (1904). "The purpose of the
supremacy clause was to avoid the introduction of disparities, confusions and conflicts
which would follow if the Government's general authority were subject to local con-
trolsY United States V. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, z83 (944). See Marcus,
supra note 2, at 697.
"351 U.S. 939 (956).
"Such an enactment would seem justifiable on the basis that it would merely estab-
lish the supremacy of such acts as the Sherman Act over state laws which might inter-
fere with their administration. See note 38 supra. That such a statute would be feasible
and that it would not meet with constitutional objection has been suggested; Comment,
21 U. CHi. L. REV. 480, 488 (1954). And such legislation was called for in United
States v. Brakes, .Inc., 157 F. Supp. 916, 99 (S.D.N..Y. 1958): "Since I do not wish
to. make rulings beyond the necessities of this case, I only note my opinion that it is
undesirable to-allow punishment' for violation of a federal law to depend on the.
vagaries of language-f6und irstate corporation statutes; and I 6ntertaiii serious dotibts
as to the power of a state to insulate a corporation from'federal criminal prosecution.
Irrthe ab~snce of. a rCongressional enactment or a statement in the Federal- Criminal
Rules, -however, I inust turn to -a-consideration of the appliable N6v York law." ..
